For more than two centuries, Wahhabism has
been Saudi Arabia's dominant faith. It is
an austere form of Islam that insists on a literal interpretation of the
Koran. Strict Wahhabis believe that all those who don't practice their
form of
Islam are heathens and enemies. Critics say that Wahhabism's rigidity
has
led it to misinterpret and distort Islam, pointing to extremists such as
Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. Wahhabism's explosive growth began in
the
1970s when Saudi charities started funding Wahhabi schools
(madrassas) and mosques from Islamabad to Culver City, California. Here
are
excerpts from FRONTLINE's interviews with Mai Yamani, an anthropologist
who studies Saudi society; Vali Nasr, an authority on Islamic
fundamentalism; Maher
Hathout, spokesperson for the Islamic Center of Southern California; and
Ahmed
Ali, a Shi'a Muslim from Saudi Arabia. (Also
see the Links and Readings section of this site for more analyses of
Wahhabism and Saudi Arabia.)
a Shi'a Muslim who grew up in Saudi Arabia
If you go to school in Saudi Arabia, what do you learn about people who are
not followers of Wahhabi, of the prophet?
The religious curriculum in Saudi Arabia teaches you that people are basically
two sides: Salafis [Wahhabis], who are the winners, the chosen ones, who will
go to heaven, and the rest. The rest are Muslims and Christians and Jews and
others.
They are either kafirs, who are deniers of God, or mushrak, putting gods next
to God, or enervators, that's the lightest one. The enervators of religion who
are they call the Sunni Muslims who ... for instance, celebrate Prophet
Mohammed's birthday, and do some stuff that is not accepted by Salafis.
And all of these people are not accepted by Salafi as Muslims. As I said,
"claimant to Islam." And all of these people are supposed to be hated, to be
persecuted, even killed. And we have several clergy -- not one Salafi clergy --
who have said that against the Shi'a and against the other Muslims. And they
have done it in Algeria, in Afghanistan. This is the same ideology. They just
have the same opportunity. They did it in Algeria and Afghanistan, and now New
York. ...
What do you mean, it reached New York?
Well, when it was a local problem, the American media did not really care much
about it. But until September 11, you saw how this faith of hate, I call it,
did to all of us, to New Yorkers and to the rest of the world, honestly. ...
But the Saudi government has condemned what happened on September
11....
... Yes, Prince Nayif condemned bin Laden, and other princes... Prince Turki
condemned bin Laden. They did not condemn that message. They condemned bin
Laden. ... Bin Laden learned this in Saudi Arabia. He didn't learn it in the
moon. That message that Bin Laden received, it still is taught in Saudi Arabia.
And if bin Laden dies, and this policy or curriculum stays, we will have other
bin Ladens. ...
Can you show me an example of what the [religious teaching is in the
schools?
Well, here, this is a book, hadif, for ninth grade. Hadif is a statement of
Prophet Mohammed. This is a book that start for ninth graders. This is talking
about the victory of Muslims over Jews. This is a hadif that I truly believe
it's not true, as a Muslim:
"The day of judgment will not arrive until Muslims fight Jews, and Muslim will
kill Jews until the Jew hides behind a tree or a stone. Then the tree and the
stone will say, 'Oh Muslim, oh, servant of God, this is a Jew behind me. Come
and kill him.' Except one type of a tree, which is a Jew tree. That will not
say that." This is taught for 14-year-old boys in Saudi Arabia.
In middle schools...
In middle schools, yes. Official middle schools. This is a book printed
by Saudi government Ministry of Education. (Ed. Note: read some
excerpts from these textbooks.)
an anthropologist specializing in Saudi society
... When the Saudi government came to power in 1932, it tried to get rid of
these various different groups, or ethnic groups or beliefs, and unify it all
into one?
Actually, yes. ... [into] the Wahhabi Islamic thought... They regarded it as
much purer because it's more fundamentalist, much more conservative than the
people who are like in the south, the people in Mecca, who had more mystical
religious trends, such as the Sufi trend, which is very mystical.
So the state religion in Saudi Arabia is this pure, stricter form of Islam?
Yes. ...
And we're told by people we've interviewed that it's the nature of this
thought, its fundamentalist nature, that can be easily manipulated, so that
people would, for example, become violent or extremist.
I think that the new mood, the new trend, especially after the Gulf War, has
become for all these neo-Wahhabis ... [is to use] Islam ... as a platform for
political ideas and activities, using Islam to legitimize political, economic,
social behavior. These people have been brought up in a country where Islam
legitimizes everything. And they have used the teachings from the religious
establishment, but became more political in expressing dissent and criticism of
the regime.
And it's been exported. To Pakistan, through systems of madrassas and
throughout the Islamic world.
And it has been exported, yes, indeed.
We are told that it's this form of fundamentalist religion represented by
this Wahhabi-influenced Islamic, if you will, ideology, or view, that has
created, if you will, a seedbed for people to become violent, to become
anti-American, and to do the kinds of things that we call "extremism" now. Is
that true?
I don't think it has to do with Islam. I don't think it has to do with any form
of this ... Islamic interpretation. ... Of course there is a problem with
dogma. But I think the problem lies with the political systems that use
religion. ...
There's been a politicization of Islam. You've said it. But bin Laden, and
his, if you will, similar people, are using Islam to promote political goals.
Yes.
They base this on a dogmatic interpretation of the religion itself, black
and white. Is the base of support that they are gaining a result of this
proliferation of this view of Islam? ... Wahhabism is what I am talking about.
... Is there a relationship between that and this development that we see of
bin Laden and his movement?
Probably there would be a relation between an interpretation of Islam that
lacks tolerance, and is a more narrow vision of the world. But particularly the
problem is about the political systems that promote this type of interpretation
of religion. This gives people the excuse, the platform, to go ahead and
express themselves in Islamic language to suit their purpose of political
ends.
an authority on Islamic fundamentalism
... Saudi Arabia has its own particular interpretation of Islam which is very
legalistic, is very austere, it's very black-and-white.
[Wahhabism is] sort of an extreme orthodoxy that historically has not been
shared by a majority of Muslims, particularly nobody outside of the Arabian
Peninsula.
...
Is there a connection between the fundamentalism of the Taliban and the
fundamentalism of the Wahhabi?
The connection has been growing very, very strong in the past 20 years, and
particularly in the past ten years. The dominant school of Islam with which the
Taliban associate -- which is known as the Deobandi school -- is very prominent
in Afghanistan and also in wide areas of Pakistan. Northern India has
increasingly gravitated toward Wahhabi teaching, and has very, very strong
organizational ties with various Wahhabi religious leaders.
Yes, yes. Because Wahhabis don't believe in tombstones, don't believe in
images being acceptable, don't believe in statues. They believe all of these
are forms of polytheism. A majority of Muslims don't share that degree of
literal reading of religious texts or banning of these kinds of reflections.
...
And the Wahhabis dominate in Saudi Arabia?
The Wahhabis dominate in Saudi Arabia, with also significant influence and
presence in United Arab Emirates, Oman, Kuwait. ...
The nature of these Islamic beliefs, you're saying, foster fundamentalist
extremism?
The teachings are fundamentalist in the definition you have in mind. The
question is who's going to cross the line and engage in violent acts or not. So
you see, recruitment into terrorist movements is small generally.
There's a big swamp out there of people.
Right, yes. And what we're confronting is not just flushing out Al Qaeda. The
bigger headache for the U.S. government is dealing with the Muslim world as a
whole, with the political ramifications of our counterattack. That's the bigger
problem. ...
a senior adviser to the Muslim Public Affairs Council and the spokesperson for the Islamic Center of Southern California
Well, the word "creed" is important because the creed of Islam is the same: the
belief in one God, the belief in the oneness of his message, the oneness of the
human family. And the devotion to God should be expressed in human rights, good
manners, and mercy, peace, justice, and freedom. No two Muslims will argue
about this creed. It is documented in the Koran as the highest authority,
modeled by the authentic teaching of the prophet, and the authenticity has
always been subject of study and debate.
So the creed is crystal clear. But the interpretation or the way you approach
life, which should be a dynamic thing, should change from time to time. When
you freeze it at a certain period or at a certain interpretation, problems
happen. I know that people called it Wahhabism; I don't subscribe to the term.
[Muhammed bin Abd al-Wahhab] at his time was considered a progressive
person.
If you freeze things at his time -- which was the eighteenth century, or the
late part of the seventeenth century, I don't remember the dates exactly -- it
becomes very stagnant and very literalist. And a very straitjacketed puritan
approach that does not cater to the changeables and the dynamics of life.
People call this Wahhabism.
Saudis, by the way, never say, "We are Wahhabis." They say, "We are just
Muslims." But they follow the teachings, and the major booklets taught in all
schools are the books of Muhammed bin Abd al-Wahhab. Anyone who's subscribing
to someone else is not very much welcomed.
So there's a quote in the [New York Times] article that we were
looking at before that basically says that Saudi Arabians believe that their
form of Islam ... is the real true form of Islam, and that pretty much any
other kind of way of practicing Islam is wrong.
Yes. This is probably some of the Saudi scholars. ... They are playing the role
of clergy; there should be no church in Islam. There should be no theological
hierarchy. But they acquired that position and, of course, them and the ruling
family are very close. After all, Muhammed bin Abd al-Wahhab is the one who
paved the road for Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, the patriarch of the family, to conquer
the rest of the [Arabian] Peninsula and to rule. So there is very great
cohesiveness between the two.
And so they believe that that's it, this is the truth. And not only that that
is it, it does not change, which is very problematic. Because we know that even
at the early history of Islam, as new issues emerged, new jurisprudence was
created to suit the change of the time and age. That's early on, at probably 25
years after the death of the prophet, peace be upon him.
So they, that group of people, believe that this is the only form and it does
not change. This of course creates major problems, and it creates some kind of
schizophrenic situation. ... I don't think that Wahhabism ... will condone or
accept lots of things that are done by some of the elite of Saudi Arabia who
come to Las Vegas and have fun and do this and do that. And we don't hear a
very strong voice exposing this or condemning them for that. But if they see a
woman driving a car, they consider this a major sin. There is confusion here.
We wanted to actually protect Islam from that very narrow tunnel-visioned look
that will make it irrelevant, will marginalize Islam as one of the shaping
factors of human civilization, as it has always been. Once you are irrelevant
to the civilization of the time and age, you can have your own cocoon and say
whatever you want. But who cares?
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